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Emergent Coopetition from a Sensemaking Perspective: A Multi-Level Analysis 
 
 
Highlights 
 
 This study explores the emergence of coopetition in a complex innovation network 
context 
 The findings offer a rare empirical exposition of the impact of history on coopetitive 
exploitation 
 With a multi-level approach, the case study exposes the navigation of coopetitive tensions 
stemming from the historic development of the coopetitive norms 
 Companies that possess a coopetitive mindset from their conception are distinct from 
those that only develop a coopetitive mindset after their conception 
 Adopting a narrative and visual process mapping approach, we also reveal the impact of 
time on coopetitive interactions 
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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the development of coopetitive sensemaking across multiple levels of 
analysis, which include individual (micro), organizational/inter-organizational (meso), and 
network/ecosystem (macro). Using a sensemaking approach, a series of proposed phases are 
posited in a processual model using teleological assumptions of time to expose coopetition as 
an emergent concept. With a coopetitive mindset as an important focus at the individual level 
of analysis, the processual model inculcates notions of competitive uncertainty, being born 
coopetitive, coopetitive exploration, exploitation, and a coopetitive uncertainty phase. Using 
different pathways through these phases, sensemaking modes are proposed, which include 
network and ecosystem sensitivity. The central contribution of the article is to expose the 
interplay of sensemaking across multiple levels of analysis and across teleological phases. 
Keywords: Coopetitive mindset; coopetitive tensions; network; ecosystem; innovation. 
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Emergent Coopetition from a Sensemaking Perspective: A Multi-Level Analysis 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article presents a conceptualization of multi-level emergent coopetition from a 
sensemaking perspective. In recent years, coopetition has become the subject of very 
significant discussion. For example, three special issues of Industrial Marketing Management 
focus on this subject (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2016; Le Roy & Czakon, 
2016) and a double special issue in International Studies in Management and Organization 
under the guest editorship of Le Roy et al. (2016). A dominant perspective is dyadic and 
simultaneous (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999), often favoured particularly in studies of high-
technology sectors (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). A somewhat more neglected perspective is 
contextual (Bengtsson et al., 2010) and grounded in Brandenburger and Nalebuff’s (1996) 
value net and the interdependencies among different groups of networked actors. It is to this 
later perspective that a contribution is furthered in this article.  
Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b, p. 98) recently comment that “coopetition can be 
approached as a strategic change that consequently triggers sensemaking processes in order to 
reach a shared understanding that enables actions and interactions.” Studies of how 
coopetitive arrangements function rarely explore how they came into being (Tidström & 
Hagberg-Andersson, 2012; Tidström & Rajala, 2016). Dahl (2014, p. 272) pointedly notes to 
the lack of “research going beyond the motives behind [simultaneous] inter-competitor 
cooperation and explaining coopetitive interactions from a process perspective as the 
relationship unfolds over time.” Dahl also emphasizes the importance of the past for 
understanding coopetition, because “competitors mutually store and learn from experiences 
created while cooperating and competing with each other.”  A key contribution in this article 
is to take an individual level focus, but to further consider how sensemaking and sensegiving 
plays out at different levels of analysis, and therefore how a coopetitive mindset (Gnyawali & 
Park, 2009) emerges from the sensemaking of individuals in a multi-layered context 
(Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). To explore the emergence of coopetitive 
sensemaking, we explore five cases of science-based small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) that share a complex innovation network, or innovative ecosystem.  
We undertake a processual analysis to expose the motion flow of emergent sensemaking in 
a coopetitive situation (Andersen & Medlin, 2016). Rather than adopting the rather narrow, 
linear assumptions of lifecycle model analysis (after Khan & Nicholson, 2014), we proceede 
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under teleological assumptions underpinned by the principle of equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 
1968)—that several paths may be taken between any two points in time. Accordingly, we 
consider the impact of time ‘on’ coopetition rather than the coopetitive interaction ‘over’ 
time.  
To establish the conceptual framing, we first outline the two main bodies of thought on 
coopetition before briefly reviewing how sensemaking can be a useful perspective when 
trying to understand the emergent properties of coopetition. We then show how emergence 
and sensemaking can play out at different levels of analysis. Next, we outline our 
methodology and explain how we study coopetition from an emergent, process perspective. 
The presentation of the findings features both narrative and visual process mapping 
approaches to the processual data. Finally, we highlight the main contributions of this study, 
its limitations, and some potential areas for further study. 
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. Approaches to the Study of Coopetition 
Coopetition has been argued to represent a new paradigm that encapsulates the strategic 
management of tensions among simultaneous, interfirm forms of collaboration and 
competition. The related strategies therefore contain “contradictory logics of interaction” 
(Raza-Ullah et al., 2014, p. 190) and involve the strategic management of opposing 
(competition and collaboration) forces between multiple companies (Fernandez et al., 2014). 
According to one extant perspective, coopetition entails simultaneous collaboration between 
two companies (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999) such that it occurs at a dyadic level, for example, 
when two competitors cooperate within a strategic alliance for new product development 
whilst competing against each other in the marketing of that product (Kylänen & Rusko, 
2011). Most articles adopt this perspective, especially when they study high-technology 
sectors (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Studies in this tradition prioritize the process by which 
cooperation and competition shift in relative strength and influence at different points in time 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010).  
A second perspective instead defines coopetition contextually, with studies that:  
“…tend to describe the competitive and cooperative part of the relationship as 
divided between actors; that is, a firm in a certain context can have some 
cooperative and some competitive relationships with other firms in this context, 
which, when combined, give rise to a “coopetitive situation, not a coopetitive 
interaction” (Bengtsson et al., 2010, p. 199). 
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 This contextual definition of coopetition is broader than the simultaneous perspective; it 
also encompasses a value net of multiple actors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
Interactions in these value nets involve customers, suppliers, complementors, and 
competitors, which implies the potential for dyadic, triadic and network interactions 
(Gnyawali et. al., 2006; Pathak et al., 2014; Yami & Nemeh, 2014). The value net contains 
multiple, direct and indirect, horizontal and vertical interactions. Because this contextual 
perspective considers environmental interactions, it predicts that specific sets of competitive 
and cooperative relationships and interdependences influence the perceptions of individuals, 
groups, or organizations. Therefore, these entities engage in coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 
2010). 
2.2. Emergent Coopetition and Sensemaking 
Emergent coopetition has been considered as unplanned competition in a cooperative settings 
(Czakon, 2010). In most conceptualizations, ‘emergence’ marks a simple contraposition to 
‘deliberate’ coopetition. Most research focuses on deliberate coopetitive strategies, 
designating the emergent strategies as the first stage of a coopetitive process (Mariani, 2007). 
Tidström and Rajala (2016) for instance note a series of stages and identify a pre-coopetition 
phase and later stages, such as silent, active, and forced coopetition phases. However, 
lifecycle models have been identified as rather linear, unidirectional, and predictable 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010). Such exposition has, in our view, focussed on the “continuously 
evolving in strength and balance” (Dahl, 2014, p. 273) between competition and 
collaboration, but less so on the cognition and actions taken by actors engaged in strategizing 
in these coopetitive arrangements. We propose that this distinction pertains to the difference 
between expositions of a coopetition ‘over’ time and expositions of the impact of time ‘on’ a 
coopetitive context, and on those involved in it. Put another way, existing insight is limited in 
not allowing for an understanding of how actors make sense of an emerging process of 
change.  
A sensemaking approach has been argued to make the link between cognition, action, and 
outcome (Abrahamsen et al.; 2012; Medlin & Törnroos, 2014). A key element of studying 
emergence is to look for features that could not have been anticipated by individuals with 
reference to preceding events (Garud et al., 2015). We therefore seek to understand how 
agents collectively and individually make sense of a coopetitive interaction as it emerges 
(after Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016 a, b) and this marks a more nuanced approach to 
emergence as can be gleaned when considering emergence as a simple contraposition to 
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deliberateness. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016 a) also speak of the iterative cycle of 
sensemaking and sensegiving, where a cognitive orientation towards coopetition is derived 
and transmitted. We posit that there is much left to learn about this itertaive process and, in 
particular, how it plays out at different levels of analysis. We draw on two specific aspects of 
sensemaking in our study, the principle of seperation in managing coopetitive pradoxes and 
the identification of benefits in coopetitive arrangements.  
First, the principle of separation (Fernandez et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2014) notes that any 
given person may find it difficult to internalize and manage the simultaneous experiencing of 
coopetition and cooperation, whereas different individuals in the same organizations may do 
so more successfully if the facets of competition and collaboration are separated. The ability 
to internalize and manage such tensions may be a basic principle of ambidexterity (Yang et 
al., 2014), and we suggest such ambidexterity is an important facet of individual 
sensemaking. Therefore, because coopetitive paradoxes materialize at various levels—
individual, industrial, network, relational, and company-specific (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014)—
we seek to understand how coopetition emerges at different levels. 
The second aspect of sensemaking in coopetition is the retrospective and projective 
assessment of benefits accrued. In addition to mutual benefits accrued through collaboration, 
Rai (2013) notes privately accrued value creation in interfirm alliances. Two discreet sources 
of value fall outside the boundaries of a simultaneous coopetitive interaction, which Rai 
(2013) refers to as private competitive benefits and private collaborative benefits. More 
recently, Volschenk et al. (2016) call for the consideration of socio-economic (public) 
benefits that accrue due to coopetition. A contextual perspective demands consideration of all 
elements (collaborative mutual benefit, private competitive benefits, private collaborative 
benefits, and public coopetitive benefits). An understanding of how these different value 
types emerge over time represents an urgent research priority in the coopetition literature. In 
particular, the notion of intertemporal coopetition (Ansari et al., 2016)—the expectation of 
commitments made in the present in expectation of future benefits—needs further 
investigation, However, like Garud et al. (2015), we are compelled to consider the emergence 
of such value at different levels of analysis. We next turn to the subject of multi-level 
coopetition.  
2.3. Emergence and Levels of Analysis  
At the head of this section we aligned ourselves with the ‘contextual’ perspective on 
coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) and in the preceding section, we stated our 
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interest in understanding the emergence of coopetition from a sensemaking perspective. We 
suggest that the contextual perspective demands consideration of multiple levels of analysis. 
Emergence also has been argued to occur at multiple levels of analysis (Bengtsson et al., 
2010). Tidström and Rajala (2016, p. 36) propose that “from a multilevel perspective, 
coopetition strategy can be related to individual, organizational, inter-organizational and 
network levels,” and they associate these ideas with micro, meso, and macro levels of 
analysis. A key issue when exploring emergence is that agents may not be aware of forces 
compelling them due to their existence in or between different levels of analysis. Bengtsson 
and Kock (2014, p. 184) recently suggest that: 
“A multilevel approach might provide a richer and more complete understanding 
on coopetition by explaining how the phenomenon at one level of analysis affects 
the other(s).”  
The overwhelming dominance in coopetition studies, quite understandably, at an inter-
organizational level, is akin to a meso-level (and simultaneous) consideration (Bengtsson & 
Kock, 1999), often favored in studies of high-technology sectors (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). 
The contextual perspective on coopetition that we favour in this study instead arguably 
encompasses more macro-level contexts such as networks (Rusko, 2014; Velu, 2016) and the 
more contemporary and underexplored concept of ecosystems (Ansari et al., 2016; Ritala et 
al., 2014). The ecosystem concept would seem to be of increasing importance in high-tech 
sectors where coopetition is conducted around digital platforms where direct relationships 
may not exist between key complementors. Ansari et al. (2016, p. 1831) note that: 
“The task of managing such coopetitive relationships is all the more challenging 
in systemic industries with multisided platforms and complex ecosystems”.  
The iterative process of sensemaking and sensegiving may flow from one network or 
ecosystem actor to another, but there is little help in current literature on which to build an 
understanding. Dahl (2014, p. 272) points to the interplay between inter-organizational and 
external factors in sensemaking when she states:  
“How and why do cooperative interactions between competitors change as the 
competitors acquire new experiences from mutual cooperation, and their external 
environment changes?”  
To understand the iterative sensemaking processes would seem to require a deeper 
understanding of the individual-level of analysis in coopetition, a level that is sorely 
underrepresented in either the simultaneous or contextual perspectives. The mindset concept 
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was introduced into the coopetition literature by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1997). 
Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b) speak of a coopetitive mindset, and this would seem 
to be an essential starting point in undertaking micro-level analysis at the level of the 
individual sensemaking. Gnyawali and Park (2009, p. 323) suggest that: 
“Firms led by executives with a co-opetition mindset are more likely to perceive 
coopetition opportunities and help other managers develop a co-opetition mindset 
and therefore more effectively manage the dynamics of co-opetition.” 
A coopetitive mindset may influence when and how companies engage in coopetition, and 
this mindset appears to be a facet of individuals and organizations. We see little study of how 
a coopetitive mindset emergences from individual sensemaking and indeed how a coopetitive 
mindset permeates through organization, network or ecosystem through a process of 
sensegiving. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016 a, p. 184) note that investigations have 
not “moved downward to lower levels in the organization to investigate the day-to-day 
activities and challenges of middle managers in particular.” Garud et al. (2015) also 
emphasize the actions taken at the level of the individual may play out at more macro levels. 
For instance, the principle of separation and the perceptions of benefits would seem to need to 
be understood at a micro-level before being traced up to their meso and macro-level effects. 
Each individual, however, has a contextual understanding of different levels of the coopetitive 
context and we consider in this article, organization (and inter-organizational), network, and 
ecosystem levels. 
We thus propose next to outline a process methodology for investigating emergent 
coopetition from a sensemaking perspective and we do so from multiple levels of analysis 
which include individual, organizational, network, and ecosystem. By focusing on individuals 
in our analysis, we expose how the process of sensemaking and sensegiving permeate 
through different levels.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Process Theorizing and Conceptual Framework  
We adopt the definition of process by Pettigrew (1997, p. 338) as a “sequence of individual 
and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over time in context.” Guided by 
Langley (1999), we apply narrative, temporal bracketing, and visual process mapping 
approaches to identify stages of the process (see also Makkonen et al., 2012). With our initial 
research questions, we sought to investigate communities of practice, using retrospective 
accounts of respondents as evidence (Golden, 1992, 1997). In an initial pass, free coding 
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identified several themes related to coopetition; that is, coopetition emerged as a theme from 
the transcripts but was not a specific focus of the interview protocols. For the second pass, the 
interviews were recoded to identify concepts related to coopetition, which included many 
allusions to processes. Therefore, in the third pass, we applied a broadly defined temporal 
bracketing to identify phases of emergent coopetition, as depicted in Figure 1, which is thus 
derived both empirically and conceptually. 
 
Pre 
coopetitive 
state 
Early 
coopetitive 
state
Functioning 
coopetitive 
state
Post 
coopetitive 
state
Teleological time and process
Le
ve
ls
 o
f 
an
al
ys
is
Past Future
Emergent coopetition and sensemaking
Micro
Macro
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Using Figure 1 as a template and a narrative theorizing approach, we present actual quotes 
from respondents that relate to the tentative phases. We conducted additional documentary 
analyses of the companies, too: reviewing news articles, scientific literature, promotional 
material, and each company’s website. Accordingly, we developed the summative process 
map that we present subsequently in Figure 2. Furthermore, we acknowledge criticisms of 
lifecycle models as too static and deterministic, such that they do not allow for teleological 
emergence (Khan & Nicholson, 2014). Thus, with our processual analysis, we attempt to 
inculcate the notion of equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) to recognize the potential for 
different routes to an undefined point in the future. 
Our visual process map (Figure 2) accordingly is based on the teleological underlying 
assumptions (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) and represents a summative account of our 
findings. This combination of techniques challenges some dominant assumptions in 
coopetition literature; it also reveals the motion and flow of coopetition (Andersen & Medlin, 
2016) as an emergent phenomenon.  
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3.2. Methodological Procedures  
The research presented in this article relies on a qualitative, multiple-case study methodology 
(Yin, 2013), which is appropriate because we study complex phenomena in a specific context 
(Baxter et al., 2008). An interpretive approach can help us understand the meanings and 
nuances associated with the experiences of the actors involved (Hopkinson, 2015; Stake, 
2013); it reflects a social constructionist epistemology in relation to time and process 
(Järvensivu & Törnroos, 2010, Tidström & Hagberg-Andersson, 2012). We conceive of time 
as socially constructed, and we define quality “in terms of the plausibility of the story and the 
overall argument” (Myers, 2013, p. 78). We used a purposive sampling criterion (Palys, 
2008) to recruit the 16 participants for this research (Table 1), each of whom worked for one 
of the five science-based SMEs (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Participants 
Company Participants  Gender Years with 
Company 
Role in the Company 
MediTest Managing Director  
 
Technical Manager  
 
R&D Manager  
R&D Scientist 
R&D Technician 
Male 
 
Male  
 
Male  
Female 
Male 
15 
 
15 
 
7 
7 
4 
Founder and medical scientist, 
responsible for overall strategy  
Testing and commercialization of 
medical diagnostics equipment  
New product development  
Medical diagnostics testing  
Creating and testing reagent products 
NanoTech Managing Director 
 
Technical Director 
Male 
 
Male 
9 
 
9 
Co-founder and qualified accountant 
responsible for strategic development 
Co-founder and development scientist 
responsible for nano-particulate 
dispersions and ultra-stable emulsions 
PhotoCat Managing Director 
Technical Director 
Female 
Male 
8 
8 
New business and market development 
Founder and scientist responsible for 
developing photo-catalyic water 
treatments 
RadCom Chief Technical Officer  
 
New Technology Manager  
 
Materials Manager  
 
Technical Manager 
Male 
 
Male 
 
Male 
 
Male 
10 
 
13 
 
8 
 
12 
Design and development of new 
radiation detection products 
Co-founder, responsible for pre-
commercial technology development 
Process development and product 
testing 
Overseeing quality control testing 
during detector manufacture 
SensSol Managing Director  
 
Design Engineer 
 
 
R&D Engineer 
Male 
 
Male 
 
 
Male 
11 
 
7 
 
 
5 
Founder, responsible for strategic 
development of gas sensor solutions  
Development of tools for measuring 
ultra-precision electrical parameters for 
gas analyzers and sensors  
New product development  
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Table 2. Details 
Company Employees Turnover Sector Company 
Age 
Products/Services Offered 
MediTest 14 £1.2 
million 
Biotechnology 15 years Manufactures a range of in 
vitro diagnostic products to 
detect, prevent, and monitor 
several medical conditions 
related to haemostasis and 
platelet function.  
NanoTech 4 Not 
available 
Nano-technology 9 years Produces customized nano-
particulate dispersions and 
ultra-stable emulsions for use 
in a wide range of industries 
PhotoCat 2 Not 
available 
Photo-catalysis 8 years Provides products and solutions 
based on photo-catalysis, a 
hybrid advanced oxidation 
process (AOP) for water and 
wastewater treatment 
RadCom 60 £2.4 
million 
Semiconductor 
manufacture 
13 years Design and manufacture of 
radiation detection equipment, 
such as digital color x-rays and 
gamma ray detection and 
imaging 
SensSol 52 £6 million Gas sensors and 
analyzers  
36 years Design and manufacture of gas 
sensors and analyzers in 
various environments, such as 
commercial diving or offshore 
industry 
 
The 16 respondents represented a wide range of managerial experience and expertise. 
Each interview lasted between one and two hours. The collected data were anonymized to 
ensure confidentiality, and each respondent received a synopsis of the research project and 
signed consent forms, confirming their agreement prior to the interview. The recorded 
interviews were transcribed; we then used immersion and crystallization to assess the data. 
Immersion is a reflexive technique to ensure the validity of qualitative data (Borkan, 1999); 
researchers immerse themselves in the data they collect by reading or examining some 
portion in detail. Crystallization (Richardson, 1994) instead is the process of temporarily 
suspending the process of examining or reading the data (immersion) to reflect on the 
analysis experience and identify or articulate patterns or themes noticed during immersion. 
These complementary processes continue until all the data have been examined and the 
patterns and claims that emerge from the data are meaningful and can be well articulated and 
substantiated. With this immersion/crystallization approach, we ensure reflexivity in both the 
collection and the analysis of our study data. 
To ensure rigor, our qualitative research also is guided by the Gioia methodology (Gioia, 
Corley & Hamilton, 2013) and Gnyawali and Song’s (2016) recommendations regarding 
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rigour in coopetition studies. In particular, we denote the boundary conditions of the 
coopetition we study (i.e., the network and ecosystem) and highlight that the sampled 
companies are all high-tech SMEs in a specific region in northern England, with global 
connections through their industrial company–level linkages. Therefore, the boundaries of 
our study occur at the network and ecosystem levels of analysis. With our rich respondent 
quotes, we illustrate the authenticity of our findings and derive a conceptual framework 
(formative and summative) to establish the potential for greater analytic generalizability (Yin, 
2013), beyond our local study context.  
4. FINDINGS  
The structure we use to present our findings reflects the time-based conceptual framework in 
Figure 1. With a narrative account, we reveal the impact of time on coopetitive interactions; 
the visual process map in Figure 2 then indicates the motion and flow of coopetitive 
interactions over time. In Table 3 we identify the companies associated with different 
subphases of Phase 1. We use the term “phase” loosely to refer to motion, even though we do 
not identify definite start or end points to these phases.  
 
Table 3. Companies associated with different subphases of Phase 1  
Progress through Phase 1  A B C D E 
Most closely associated with Phase 1a * *   * 
Most closely associated with Phase 1b   * *  
 
4.1. Phase 1a: Competitive Uncertainty 
Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b) acknowledge the importance of individual-level 
sensemaking in cooperative processes. We identify a key aspect of sensemaking as triggered 
by a cognitive state of competitive uncertainty—a doubt as to the effectiveness of past 
competition based interaction. Past experience can influence future coopetitive interactions 
when the participants contrast “their own changed views of competition with the established 
mindset of the past” (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b, p. 102). At an individual level, 
such competitive uncertainty often was triggered by disruptive technological developments in 
their networks or ecosystems, for instance, when they fear that competitors are capable of 
outspending them on R&D:  
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“We’ve already talked about [collaboration]. Instead of them investing shed-loads 
of money in doing [R&D] themselves, if you like, we collaborate on it. If it really 
takes off, we either continue to manufacture for them or they do it themselves.” 
(Technical Manager, MediTest) 
We associate a key feature of sensemaking in this phase as being reactive at the micro- 
and meso-levels from events at a macro-level. A further motive was triggered at a meso-level, 
when it became apparent that having developed a product, the company lacked resources to 
exploit it. For example, NanoTech required the services of a competitor that understood the 
technology it was trying to develop and could offer testing services to help it commercialize 
its innovation:  
“We received some money for basically proof of concept. So some of that money 
was used to see whether [our] machine works or not. We wanted to do that on 
live projects rather than just little bits of material, we wanted to get straight into 
the marketplace and work with people [competitors] we know who could provide 
us with a testing service and offer feedback.” (Managing Director, NanoTech) 
Other companies, such as SensSol, also demonstrated a reactive approach in their use of 
outsourcing if they lacked expertise: “We want to … capture their skills and expertise and 
creativity to the benefit of the company” (Managing Director, SensSol). Therefore, for these 
technology companies, R&D activity is the first point in the value chain at which competitive 
intent emerges, and occurs in what we call the competitive uncertainty phase. In this phase, 
the rules of competition come into question, and other interaction methods are considered, 
which may or may not include coopetition. The emergence of coopetitive sensemaking in this 
phase emerges due to macro-level stimuli triggering doubt as to the viability of pure 
competition as a sustainable mode of interaction at a micro or meso levels. Individuals 
(usually senior managers) then began to explore coopetition as an option and, as they 
developed a coopetitive mindset, passed their experiences to others in the company. This 
iterative process of sensegiving and sensemaking was greatly enhanced when other actors 
linked through direct network relationships possessed a coopetitive mindset, and where the 
norms of the broader ecosystem actors also possessed a collective coopetitive mindset. This 
phase merged into phase 2 when the embryonic development of a coopetitive mindset at a 
micro and meso-level is evident, and which subsequently leads to more proactive exploration 
of coopetition possibilities.  
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4.2. Phase 1b: Born Coopetitive  
By considering coopetition as an emergent phenomenon, we investigated the origins of a 
coopetitive mindset. In some cases, a coopetitive mindset had developed having passed 
through the competitive uncertainty phase of sensemaking, but in others, it seemed evident 
from the very birth of the company. Thus, in Figure 2 we separate the early phase of 
emergent coopetition into two facets and highlight a notion of being born coopetitive in this 
section. In general, we identified that a coopetitive mindset increasingly was evident in the 
studied sectors, in response to previous ventures, peer influence, and the less relational 
ecosystem context of the tech sector. Hence, we feel it is possible to speak of a macro-level 
coopetitive mindset as an aggregation of meso and micro level mindsets. 
RadCom, a manufacturer of semi-conductor materials, already had entered an innovation 
network organized by the U.S. government, which funded research by companies involved in 
chemical production. By organizing a forum to bring together competitors that could discuss 
pertinent research, the U.S. government acted as a complementor, through and indirectly 
influenced coopetitive exchanges of companies in the focal industries: 
“I think the [issue of working with] competitors … is very interesting for the … 
industry because it is such a small industry. There is probably only four 
[companies] in the world that [produce these items], and because there is such a 
want for these [products] by the likes of the U.S. government, then something 
very unusual happened in that the U.S. government will organize a forum for 
people, representatives from the different companies to come together and discuss 
technology innovation. Which is kind of unusual, I don’t know many other 
industries where you would invite, you know [competitors].” (Materials Manager, 
RadCom) 
If respondents had been involved in similar interactions in previous companies, they 
tended to maintain a coopetitive mindset when entering or founding new ventures, such that 
they were born coopetitive. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b) cite changes in a macro 
discourse that affects the propensity of actors to engage with coopetition.  
“I’m loath to re-invent a wheel, I just want.… I will pick the best thing that I have 
seen or I have available in my network, or whatever, or my knowledge, or my 
past knowledge. I’ll pick that and I’ll go with that as my route [to market].” 
(Materials Manager, RadCom)  
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In this sense, the mindset can emerge from previous micro-level histories. In the previous 
category (Phase 1a) we define a coopetitive mindset as emerging within the phase; here 
(Phase 1b), we define it as evident at the start of the phase. We therefore associate the 
coopetitive mindset of a born coopetitive company with a desire to create new markets by 
developing and extending their innovations: 
“You’re creating a market, you know, if you make a simpler product. I mean, 
[competitors] will start to do things they perhaps didn’t do before. They find other 
uses for the product.” (Technical Manager, RadCom) 
A further aspect of the born coopetitive state comes from PhotoCat, which actively 
positions itself as a general complementor (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) rather than as a 
competitor. Adner (2017) propose the term multilaterality to define a distinction between 
ecosystems and networks in that an ecosystem cannot be simply decomposable to a series of 
dyadic relationships. Complementation in an ecosystem context may therefore be complex 
and indirect rather than relational as in network context.  
“What I’m saying is that we don’t want to be seen as competitors. We’re 
complementary technology to any other … treatment technique.” (Technical 
Director, PhotoCat) 
In this instance, the born coopetitive company presents itself to other network agents as a 
general complementor. With its coopetitive mindset from its inception, a born coopetitive 
company recognizes the value of both collaboration and competition in its sector. In turn, it 
may avoid the competitive uncertainty associated with Phase 1a, enabling the company to 
engage directly in coopetitive exploration (Phase 2) with larger competitors. As one 
respondent observed:  
“We deliberately set out to aim our product at large multi-national companies that 
might be doing similar processes worldwide. We reduce the barrier, and that’s the 
model we’ve adopted.” (Technical Director, PhotoCat) 
With this evidence of a coopetitive mindset, our teleological assumptions suggest that the 
phases may overlap and coexist, rather than one appearing as the other disappears (see Figure 
2). The finding of the existence of a born coopetitive company is tentative; such a phase 
would, however, seem significant for consideration of coopetition as an emergent property. 
We identify here that a born coopetitive company is new at the level of the organization 
(meso), but whose staff at the individual level have coopetitive histories, and which are 
embedded with macro-level networks and ecosystems, in which these individuals have 
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histories. Hence, consideration of levels of emergence seems essential to understanding a 
born coopetitive company. However, work remains to be done to chase an individual level 
coopetitive mindset to its embryonic origins, which may be linked to studies of dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997).  
4.3. Phase 2: Coopetitive Exploration 
At the beginning of Phase 2, companies possess a coopetitive mindset at least at an individual 
level but also we found, at a meso level. Individuals and companies here are inclined to 
explore coopetition proactively as a potential strategy and a coopetitive mindset helped them 
to proactively make sense of coopetitive opportunities. This quality became evident to many 
companies initially because they shared R&D or new product development activities with 
larger competitors. It thus offered a means make sense of competitive asymmetries while 
initiating coopetition and identify the value in such arrangements. Phase 2 denotes SMEs 
entering a period of coopetitive exploration in which, over time, they identified important 
potential exchange partners and established tentative beneficial exchange relationships.  
The interviews offer evidence that among those companies, which developed a coopetitive 
mindset during Phase 1 (rather than possessing it when entering Phase 1), they turned to their 
old networks first when seeking potential collaborators, which included competitors. Several 
respondents accordingly noted the importance of old networks, and the influence of former 
employee networks. This impact of former employees in old networks has been insufficiently 
studied (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010) and, to our knowledge, escaped consideration in 
coopetition literature. In our sample, coopetitive mindset emerged from the personal 
relationships that the Technical Director of NanoTech had built and maintained with an old 
network of ex-colleagues. Ties with former colleagues, who often worked in competitor 
organizations, were considered easy to leverage because the connection already existed as 
“low-hanging fruit,” or an easy-to-reach source of external knowledge:  
“I hate to use the word low-hanging fruit, but we had personal contacts even from 
previous lives with [other] companies.” (Technical Director, NanoTech) 
However, an issue arises with regard to the existence of a non-coopetitive mindset, as 
ensconced within the prevailing norms of the old network. Existing networks with non-
coopetitive traditions constrain coopetition, and limits also arise when companies in existing 
networks are the only option for collaborative partnerships. At the dyad level, in relationships 
between old colleagues, a process of sensemaking and sensegiving was evident to establish a 
coopetitive mindset at the level of the dyad (meso). At a more macro level, the effect of 
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multilateral external complementors (e.g., the U.S. government) introduced new potential 
coopetitive exchange partners into the ecosystem and also had a disruptive influence on non-
coopetitive mindsets. In this respect, the ecosystem concept may be more appropriate than the 
more relational notion of a network. This phase accordingly was experienced differently in 
terms of when the actors develop a coopetitive mindset (in Phase 1a or 1b). The tensions here 
seem different in this phase relative to the development of this a coopetitive mindset.  
In contrast with the reliance on old networks, participation in an ecosystem in which the 
U.S. government was central was recognized by those companies that had progressed through 
Phase 1a as a potential source of funding for their R&D activity, but also as a source of 
tension, because it compelled working with competitors with which there was no history at 
the micro or meso-levels.. With the intervention of this influential complementor, RadCom 
needed to protect its competitive advantage, based on intellectual property (IP) and be 
guarded in its coopetition within the network, which represented a very small industry: 
“It’ll be the game of chess that we play often, when you’re working with these 
people, you’re letting sufficient out, but keeping certain, you know? It’s like 
telling people what you’re going to do, but not how, isn’t it? That’s the trick.” 
(Materials Manager, RadCom) 
Tensions between knowledge leakage and transfer similarly have received some attention, 
especially in terms of how they might be handled through forms of ambidexterity (Fernandez 
& Chiambaretto, 2016; Yang et al., 2014). Ambidexterity thus was a significant mediator of 
coopetitive tensions at the individual actor level, particularly when the participants were not 
former colleagues. Supporting separation involved managing tensions within the SMEs and 
integrating tensions between individuals. Nevertheless, most companies in the sample were 
aware that they needed to be careful when building collaborative relationships with ex-
colleagues who currently worked for competitors; the competition persisted, because they had 
to protect their intellectual property rights.  
Therefore, the focus in this stage is on value creation, concomitant with attempts to protect 
value-capture mechanisms. Science-based companies that develop new innovations have a 
high degree of appropriability from their patents and tacit know-how, which they need to 
protect. A trigger point for the exploration of coopetitive options thus occurred after the 
sampled companies achieved intellectual protection. In these instances, the need for skillful 
ambidexterity also decreased significantly.  
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If the collaborative benefits were not reciprocal, the SMEs in our sample reported the 
private competitive benefit of being able to gauge the size of the contracts and types of work 
their competitors could achieve. However, even when the SMEs acknowledged the 
importance of reciprocity, they did not always recognize its mutual public value in terms of 
building network strength. Therefore, this stage of coopetition is a point before a reciprocal 
dyadic or tangible value exchange takes place. We also note some distinctions in the 
exploration stage related to two born coopetitive companies: PhotoCat positioned itself as a 
general complementor rather than a competitor, and RadCom’s external complementor (U.S. 
government) introduced new potential coopetitive exchange partners into the ecosystem. 
4.4. Phase 3: Coopetitive Exploitation  
The functioning stage of coopetitive exploitation primarily occurs when private collaborative 
and competitive benefits are reciprocally (rather than unilaterally) obtained and coopetition 
occurs simultaneously. Indeed, reciprocation of benefits as a factor for establishing 
coopetition previously has been studied by Czakon (2009). To analyze how this phase 
unfolds, relative to the emergent properties of coopetitive sensemaking, we examine how 
tensions emerge, as well as how actors make sense of coopetition relative to the previous 
subphases identified in Table 3.   
4.4.1. Phase 3 for companies passing through Phase 1a 
Where a coopetitive mindset developed during Phase 1a, trust occurred at the individual 
(micro) level, often between participants with a shared history. Therefore, trust was evident 
between individuals engaged in coopetitive exploitation. NanoTech, a single product 
company, similarly developed its initial innovation in collaboration with a larger company, 
one of its closest competitors: 
“We basically developed the [innovation] in conjunction with [company] that 
would potentially become our main competitor. They are hot on developing the 
technology while we are really hot on the marketplace and what’s out there. It’s 
an excellent fit together. The intellectual property is going to be shared.” 
(Technical Director, NanoTech) 
Thus for NanoTech, sharing development costs and creating shared intellectual property 
with a competitor helped it compensate for its own limited resource base. Through their 
individual-level relationships, participants managed to achieve ambidexterity and collaborate 
and compete simultaneously in a situation marked by significant asymmetries:  
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“We are actually competing [with] the technology that they’ve developed 
themselves, which is directly competing with what we’re doing. But still we’ve 
kept that separate. And some things have replaced their other technologies in the 
long-term.” (Technical Director, NanoTech) 
The trust developed among actors from an old network at an individual level somewhat 
negated the principle of separation, allowing for the effective management of tensions both 
within the sampled companies (meso) and across individuals (micro).  
MediTest also progressed through Phase 1a and entered into a coopetitive interaction with 
a university that wanted to scale up the results of its R&D activity and develop a new product 
for a spin-out company that would produce medical products. It sought assistance from 
MediTest, a potential competitor in the specific medical market that manufactured similar 
products, to provide manufacturing expertise and help commercialize the innovation: 
“We’ve built a close relationship with [University]. They came to us, they had 
ideas, and they came to us because they wanted us to manufacture a product for a 
spin-out company they’ve developed.” (R&D Manager, MediTest) 
MediTest was drawn into the arrangement by the university; its coopetitive involvement 
thus was reactive. They provided manufacturing expertise on an ad hoc basis to the 
university, in the hope that it would become the preferred manufacturer and eventually a 
supplier to the university’s purported spin-out company. In effect, it hoped to be a future 
collaborator and future competitor in the market. This approach seems consistent with the 
term used by Ansari et al. (2016) of intertemporal coopetition, and we extend the term here to 
denote intertemporal sensemaking as a key facet of a mature coopetitive mindset. The 
university’s scientists called on MediTest’s expertise when they needed it: 
“We’re actually helping develop some products for [University]. They had some 
ideas and that needed someone to follow on up through it with the projects, you 
know? They just call on us when they need us.” (Technical Manager, MediTest) 
In this ad hoc arrangement, familiarity helps attenuate other, more contractual forms of 
governance. In this sense, intertemporal sensemaking seems to be facilitated by historical 
network relationships. Significantly, a proposed spin-out company would be a potential 
competitor for MediTest’s own range of original equipment products. The Managing Director 
had planned on manufacturing and selling its own branded products rather than 
manufacturing products on behalf of other companies. But this coopetitive exploitation 
arrangement emerged because MediTest sold its capabilities as a contract manufacturer, 
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developing products on behalf of its potential future competitor. In this sense, the manager 
mitigated a risk of a disruptive force in the ecosystem. The success of this approach largely 
can be attributed to the Managing Director, who communicated effectively and had built 
strong social relationships during Phase 1a. In turn, he was able to navigate coopetitive 
tensions successfully, overcoming the challenges of separation through the skillful use of 
ambidexterity mixed with intertemporal sensemaking during coopetitive exploitation. 
Furthermore, the spin-off was likely to be born with a coopetitive mindset, adding a new 
trajectory to the process map in Figure 1: A born coopetitive mindset might emerge from the 
culture of the companies from which the company spins off.  
In some cases, advice provided the means to engage in network building with competitors. 
The Managing Director of MediTest, a prolific networker, regularly visited customers, 
sharing his expertise, among other things. As one respondent explained:  
“He was willing to provide advice on the use of competitors’ products and used 
these visits as opportunities to build personal relationships with existing and 
potential customers, sharing his expertise in the area of Warfarin management.” 
(Technical Manager, MediTest)  
Through this unilaterally giving approach, the Managing Director delivered a private 
collaborative benefit to competitors, while simultaneously generating a private competitive 
benefit for MediTest, a phenomenon we label non-collaborative competitor benefit. With his 
preexisting relationships, the Managing Director felt confident that reciprocity would come 
later. The presence of trust, earned earlier in the process, held significant importance in these 
interactions.  
For SensSol though, what started as an outsourcing relationship soon developed into a 
more coopetitive relationship, based on a reciprocal dyadic or tangible value exchange:  
“The guy who works for [Company Q], he’s got a lot of good experience in 
product development so we try and get something back a little bit in terms of how 
we can develop our products, sort of innovating through ideas generation.” 
(Design Engineer, SensSol)  
The Managing Director, displaying network sensitivity, thus explains how SensSol pooled 
its existing knowledge in cooperation with Company Q to provide a solution for one 
customer:  
“We’re doing a lot of work with [Company Q for] a company that puts space 
craft into space … so they want to preserve life … and there’s all sorts of things 
 22 
 
can happen on a space craft … so we used our existing knowledge to come up 
with a solution for them.” (Managing Director, SensSol). 
SensSol initially displayed a reactive approach in this arrangement with Company Q. 
However, we also find a notable propensity of companies that had undertaken their first 
successful coopetitive interaction to look actively for more of them. As a result of the success 
of its early (reactive) coopetitive exchange, SensSol subsequently adopted a more proactive 
approach to coopetition. For example, rather than just seeking to protect its intellectual 
property, it formulated a more strategic approach to new product development and introduced 
an innovation program that would enable it to set more formal coopetitive arrangements, 
similar to those with Company Q:  
“We’re trying to think beyond what we do currently … our innovation program is 
coming in as … we want to try and work with the competition … to find markets 
where we can use our skills and expertise to … open up new markets.” (Design 
Engineer, SensSol) 
The innovation program involved here was perceived in a network and ecosystem context, 
again suggested a mature coopetitive mindset was open to collaboration with known 
competitors in the existing network. During the early phases, some companies (i.e., A, B, and 
E) found it challenging to develop a coopetitive mindset. Other companies that were born 
coopetitive (i.e., C and D) were able to establish and maintain a coopetitive mind-set when 
entering and/or founding new ventures. For example, RadCom was a spin-out from a 
university; it was very focused on R&D and maintained a sustained period of mutual 
engagement with its source university, such that the two organizations worked closely 
together in cooperation. Through this sustained complementary relationship, RadCom also 
gained a private competitive benefit, through access to the university’s network of partner 
organizations. 
4.4.2. Phase 3 for companies passing through Phase 1b 
In two companies, C and D, we recognize the characteristics of being born coopetitive. 
Coopetition emerges from outsourcing activities with competitors; some SMEs also 
participate in competitor networks. PhotoCat, which is located in an innovation center, 
proactively participated in networking events with competitors organized by that center, 
through an innovation forum that encouraged knowledge-sharing activities, idea exchanges, 
and informal relationships. These interactions were often informal and enabled PhotoCat to 
take a coopetitive stance, working with broader multilateral actors outside the networks of its 
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mangers from its foundation. Put another way, managers in this type of company are able to 
make sense of an emergent ecosystem context as well as the historically familiar former 
networks. Key in this facility is to identify opportunities to emerge during interaction, rather 
than having a clear opportunity to exploit before interaction is entered into.  
“It is quite informal, and I think the idea is that companies know what other 
companies are capable of. So, if they come across something that they cannot 
manage with one of their clients, they say ‘ah!’ and then [they] start talking, 
potentially either swapping ideas, or working together, to provide a solution, 
because at the end of the day, the customer doesn’t care who’s doing the work as 
long as it’s done.” (Technical Director, PhotoCat) 
What we therefore note from these accounts is a characteristic of born coopetitive 
companies, namely, ecosystem sensitivity, which contrasts with the network sensitivity 
among those companies that developed a coopetitive mindset in Phase 1. That is, companies 
with ecosystem sensitivity demonstrate a more proactive approach to interaction and location 
decisions.  
RadCom had gained their first commercial contract through the US Government forum, as 
the Chief Technical Officer confirmed, “We’ve got out first large research contract with the 
American government – to grow materials for them”. We therefore identify RadCom having 
a coopetitive mindset from inception through its proactive pursuit of the US government 
contract:  
“After maybe a year, or a year and a half of knocking on the US Government’s 
door, because they are one of the key people who pull this type of technology, we 
opened up a funding contract with them and that’s been the backbone of our 
materials development technology in the last two and a half years.” (Chief 
Technical Officer, RadCom) 
We further identify a coopetitive mindset in RadCom through its willingness to work 
cooperatively with competitors involved in the US Government forum:  
“You know [competitors] are going to be working on it, you don’t necessarily 
know how many… but you know that “alright, I’ve got this technology that could 
be used for that”, let’s see if we can use this to get into the market.” (Chief 
Technical Officer, RadCom)  
RadCom also made its location decision to link to the source university’s network of 
partners, which provided it access to specialist equipment, as well as sources of expertise: 
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“We spent the first year or so still using the [University] facilities and were very 
much part of their physics department. So we’d use the mechanical workshop 
there to get parts made up that we required and we still use the network there 
quite a lot to source expertise.” (Chief Technical Officer, RadCom) 
In addition to this proactive effort to access partner organizations, RadCom helped 
commercialize the university’s basic R&D, which gave it access to those R&D results: 
“[The university] had other separately funded programs to work on growth, and 
we obviously help them … and I mean we have access to their information, 
results and things.” (New Technology Manager, RadCom) 
By considering sensemaking during coopetitive exploitation phases, we have identified 
different mechanisms through which companies that developed a coopetitive mindset during 
phase 1 and those we denote as born coopetitive make sense of active coopetition. The former 
maintain greater network sensitivity, the latter more ecosystem sensitivity, meaning they are 
more willing to allow coopetitive opportunities to emerge through interaction with previously 
unconnected actors in the ecosystem. A further key sensemaking assets is intertemporal 
sensemaking, allowing smaller first to invest in coopetition relationships without the 
immediate expectation of reciprocation. However, this phase may eventually lead to 
coopetitive uncertainty and a move again to a different mechanism of collaboration and 
competition, which we discuss next.  
4.5. Phases 4a and 4b: Coopetition versus Competition  
All our companies remained in a state of coopetition during the study. However, apparent in 
the accounts were discussions of what we have called coopetitive uncertainty. This facet of 
sensemaking allowed us to consider an ‘after’ coopetition phase, although we stress these are 
detectable as future loaded projections at the time of the study. 
Our research revealed the propensity of ecosystem sensitive companies, such as C and D, 
to exploit their initial coopetitive interactions in external competitor networks and actively 
seek to multiply their coopetitive relationships on the basis of that initial period of 
sensemaking. PhotoCat had not yet entered into a formal coopetitive agreement. For 
PhotoCat, its innovation was a complementary technology; it was becoming increasingly 
proactive in its approach to seeking coopetition partners: 
“We’re looking for somebody that would be interested to develop joint IP, either 
in the actual format, the physical form of the catalyst material, or in the chemical 
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composition because of certain doping you might get quite radically-improved 
performance, so we’d be looking at all of that.” (Technical Director, PhotoCat) 
For RadCom, which was a born coopetitive in our view, considerations of partnering with 
a competitor also involved the potential for acquisitions: 
“We occupy a pretty broad range in the supply chain so … we could acquire 
anywhere in the supply and it would be complementary. That is different to a lot 
of [competitor] businesses that … might not have a presence everywhere in the 
supply chain, so it might be much more difficult for them to make an acquisition 
… and have it make logical sense. Whereas … we can really make an acquisition 
anywhere in the supply chain if it’s a sensible acquisition.” (Chief Technical 
Officer, RadCom) 
In contrast, network-sensitive companies, such as MediTest and NanoTech, adopted a 
more reactive approach. NanoTech sought to share future development costs with a 
competitor in a formal coopetitive relationship to compensate for its limited resource base: 
“We’ll share some of the costs but either way we’ll [have] helped each other save money 
through that joint development” (Technical Director, NanoTech). Beyond cost savings, 
attempts to formally collaborate with competitors were linked to necessity. NanoTech needed 
to acquire the services of a competitor to help it commercialize its innovation; SensSol had 
introduced its own innovation program, so it could establish formal collaborative 
arrangements with competitors. Following an initially reactive, early coopetitive exchange, 
SensSol subsequently implemented a more proactive approach: 
“We were just ticking along a little bit in terms of products we sell … and [our] 
innovation program highlighted the need for us to be innovating … building 
formal relationships in order to grow; otherwise we were going to sort of 
stagnate.” (R&D Engineer, SensSol) 
Thus, with regard to the impact of coopetitive functioning during the exploitation stage, an 
SMEs’ ability to pursue formal interfirm coopetition, we find that ecosystem sensitive, born 
coopetitive companies (companies PhotoCat and RadCom) were more proactive in their 
pursuit of formal coopetitive relationships. Network sensitive companies (Companies 
MediTest, NanoTech, and SenSol) instead were more reactive. In Table 4, we summarize 
some key emergent properties of coopetition that we have identified with these cases, which 
we also link to Phases 1 and 2. By advancing these properties, we can better understand how 
they affect the functioning of coopetition.  
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Table 4. Key emergent properties of coopetition 
Phase 1a Phase 1b 
Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case 
Reactive 
sensemaking 
Macro-
meso-micro 
MediTest  
NanoTech  
SensSol 
Proactive 
sensemaking 
Micro-
meso-
macro 
PhotoCat  
RadCom  
Competitive 
uncertainty 
Micro and/or 
meso 
MediTest NanoTech 
SensSol  
Born coopetitive Meso PhotoCat  
RadCom  
Fear of 
disruptive 
innovation 
Macro-micro MediTest Coopetitive 
mindset evident 
Micro 
and 
Meso 
PhotoCat 
RadCom  
Resource 
constraints 
Meso NanoTech Ecosystem and 
network history 
Macro-
micro 
NanoTech 
 
Phase 2 Phase 3 
Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case Feature Level of 
effect 
Identified in case 
Networked 
sensemaking 
Macro 
(network)-
meso-micro 
NanoTech  Network 
sensitivity 
(companies 
passing through 
1a) 
Micro 
and meso 
MediTest 
NanoTech  
SensSol  
Network 
sensegiving 
Micro-meso-
macro 
(network) 
RadCom  Ecosystem 
sensitivity  
(companies 
passing through 
1b) 
Micro 
and meso 
PhotoCat  
RadCom  
Former 
colleague 
dyads 
Meso-meso NanoTech  Intertemporal 
sensemaking  
Micro MediTest 
General 
complementor 
Meso 
(ecosystem) 
PhotoCat  Exploitative 
ambidexterity 
Meso PhotoCat  
Protected 
advantage 
heightens 
coopetitive 
opportunity 
exploration 
Meso-Macro 
(network 
and 
ecosystem) 
 
 
RadCom  Coopetitive 
uncertainty 
Meso PhotoCat  
Development 
of 
ambidexterity 
to manage 
emerging 
tensions  
Micro  MediTest    
 
Table 4 provides a key summary of the main features we identify in our narrative, the 
levels at which we identify that effect at play and the cases in which we identified them. 
Given that Phase 4 was projected, we do not provide granular details of this phase. Further, 
applying our initial conceptual framework (Figure 1) to our findings, we obtain a visual 
process map of emergent coopetition (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Visual process map of emergent coopetition  
The process map (Fig. 2) challenges the assumptions of previous work suggesting that 
coopetition is a linear flow from emergent to deliberate coopetition. With this summative 
map, we attempt to inculcate the notion of equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) and recognize 
the different available routes to undefined points in the future. In Phase 1 we identify two 
subphases (competitive uncertainty and born coopetitive) in relation to the development of 
coopetitive mindset. These phases are experienced differently, in terms of when the actors 
develop a coopetitive mindset (either Phase 1a or 1b). With our loose definition of phases, we 
visualize Phase 2 as an iterative loop that may lead back to coopetitive uncertainty several 
times, and we posit that the Phase 3 exploitation still entails ongoing exploration. We note a 
state of coopetitive uncertainty in Phase 3 that allows us to posit an ‘after’ coopetition phase. 
In the projected phase 4 companies either move from a functioning state of coopetitive 
exploitation toward a more formal coopetitive relationship, or return to a state of competition.  
5. DISCUSSION  
We conclude with a summary of our main findings and their contributions to current theory 
on coopetition. We also cite some practical implications, limitations, and research directions.  
We have advanced understanding of how the historical legacy of interaction affects 
coopetitive exploitation. Our intent has been to explore the impact of time on coopetitive 
interaction, rather than just explore coopetition over time; that is, we seek to expose 
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emergence. With this early attempt to explore empirically the emergence of a coopetitive 
mindset, we identify a Phase 1 of coopetition, in which consideration of a coopetitive mindset 
is pertinent. It consists of two forms. In one, a coopetitive mindset emerges from a sense of 
doubt about whether competition is the most effective form of business development, or what 
we call a competitive uncertainty phase. Companies passing through this phase tend to have 
reactive motives, in response to competitive moves or broad network trends. The second 
observed state is what we call a born coopetitive; to the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to use this term.  
Figure 2 acknowledges some of the doubt about the emergence of a coopetitive mindset, 
but in at least one case, we are confident that a spin-off truly was born coopetitive. In this 
sense, historical factors may underpin a coopetitive mindset. However, there is even more to 
learn from this finding, such that we also define a stage of coopetitive exploration, during 
which the company iteratively explores opportunities for value co-creation and value capture. 
We consider it essential to present this phase as multi-directional, in that it appears reversible, 
interruptible, and greatly accelerated, in no particular linear order. A process model based on 
teleological assumptions therefore seems most appropriate. We further note that non–born 
coopetitive companies seem to progress more cautiously through Phase 2, whereas the born 
coopetitive companies make rapid progression through Phase 2 (perhaps even skipping it). 
The born coopetitive companies also seem highly proactive when seeking locations close to 
possible complementors (that initially were strangers), whereas non–born coopetitive 
companies rely more on old networks and former colleagues when exploring coopetitive 
arrangements. The norms of these networks may constrain the development of coopetitive 
norms.  
In Phase 3 (coopetitive exploitation), companies are able to use the trust built through their 
historical establishment of coopetitive norms at an individual level. In contrast, the born 
coopetitive companies have more of a “blind-faith” approach to coopetition; having 
progressed rapidly through Phase 2, they have somewhat more difficulty managing tensions 
at an individual level, in that they have not gone through the laborious but valuable trust-
building and norm-developing process. We refer to these two approaches as network 
sensitivity versus ecosystem sensitivity. Both signal distinct sensemaking approaches, and 
they offer different value in distinct phases. Ecosystem sensitivity offers the potential to make 
rapid progress toward coopetitive exploitation at the company level, but it suffers more 
tensions at the individual level due to the lack of interpersonal norms.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This article offers a theoretical contribution to the contextual approach to coopetition. In 
presenting our findings, we make a processual contribution, which is both emergent and 
teleological in its underlying assumptions. We add to the small body of empirical work that 
explores coopetition as an emergent property (Dahl, 2014). Unlike previously available 
expositions of coopetition over time (Tidström & Rajala, 2016), we address the impact of a 
history of coopetitive exploitation. Taking a lead from Tidström and Rajala (2016), we detail 
how these historical legacies exert effects at different levels of interaction (i.e., individual, 
company, network, and ecosystem). Our findings are response to the call to apply a 
sensemaking approach to coopetition research (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). We 
add considerably to an understanding how a coopetitive mindset effects the emergence of 
coopetition and we particularly answer calls for multi-level insights into both sensemaking 
and emergent perspectives on coopetition.   
6.1. Managerial Implications  
There are several managerial implications that derive from our findings. First, our findings 
allow managers to better understand the context of emergent coopetition. However, given that 
our findings involve the study of emergence – matters that could not be predicted before their 
manifestation, it is difficult to propose that the findings sensemaking can be useful to those 
developing a coopetitive mindset. However, the principle of sensegiving is a more useful 
concept in a contextual reading. Networks often have focal companies and ecosystems have 
lead companies and platform owners. For individuals with a coopetitive mindset in 
companies embedded in networks and ecosystems with actors which predominantly have a 
non-coopetitive mindset, the principle of sensegiving should be seen as a form of persuasion 
best achieved through different levels, from individual to company, through to network and 
ecosystem levels. Second, those with a coopetitive mindset can better communicate the 
benefits at different levels of analysis and advise of the way that the coopetitive tensions can 
be managed with their company, for instance through the principle of separation. Third, the 
notion of a born coopetitive company is a useful concept for companies in tech sectors. One 
feature of a successful spin-off is that the potential new company has a collective coopetitive 
mindset, and this should be used as a means of assessing their potential ‘fitness’ for survival 
in coopetitive networks and ecosystems. Fourth a caution we offer is the over reliance of old 
networks and an under sensitivity to ecosystems. A mature coopetitive mindset seems to 
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involve a need to be willing to allow coopetitive opportunities to emerge through interaction 
with actors between which there is no history. Fifth, small companies engaging in coopetition 
should in particular be aware of intertemporal sensemaking – giving out value without 
immediate expectation of reciprocity.  
6.2. Limitations and Further Research 
The main limitation of this research is its focus on a single network context. Examining 
additional cases in different spatial and cultural contexts would add depth to the assertions 
advanced herein. We also call for a deeper understanding of coopetitive mindsets and how 
they emerge, potentially as flows across different levels (e.g., individual to group, to and 
from networks). Such an exploration might take a dynamic capability perspective. In our 
framework, we project anticipated next moves, from the perspective of companies engaged in 
coopetitive exploitation. Further research could retrospectively examine a post-coopetitive 
phase and its links to earlier phases. We also anticipate additional coopetitive uncertainty 
between our Phases 3 and 4, but we could not establish this sub-phase with our data, because 
all our study cases remained in the coopetitive exploration phase. Further research could also 
extend the ecosystem context to platforms. Increasingly, coopetition and open innovation 
initiatives are clustered around platform leaders, rather than just being spatially co-located. 
The emergence of coopetitive mindset in platform contexts represents an urgent topic for 
research.  
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